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I.

INTRODUCTION

[I]f a court were to entertain a private claim that a
regulated rate was unreasonable or unlawful, it would
necessarily have to second-guess the decisions of the
agency to whom the legislature has delegated the
†

Mr. Decker is a business litigator at Briggs and Morgan, P.A. in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, with an emphasis in railroad and energy law. He was
among a team that represented the electric utility in Hoffman v. Northern States
Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15,
2008), discussed infra Part III.B.
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responsibility to approve rates, and a court generally
would not have the technical expertise to do so nor the
capacity to consider the entire rate structure or to balance
1
all competing interests.
With that recognition, the Minnesota Supreme Court formally
adopted the “filed-rate doctrine.” The doctrine protects uniform
regulatory oversight by curbing lawsuits that implicate a company’s
“filed rate” (i.e., a mandatory tariff filed with a government agency
that establishes exclusive charges and services).
Businesses
immediately affected by the doctrine include railroad,
telecommunications, gas, electric, and insurance companies that
must have their tariffs administratively approved. The upshot for
such regulated industries is clear: the centralized, uniform
regulation that compels such entities to offer services on
government-approved terms will be insulated from the regulatory
effects of litigation.
The impact on Minnesota state court litigation will be
profound. When applicable, the doctrine signals the end of the
judicial line for otherwise cognizable claims. Look no further than
Schermer, which dismissed a certified class action involving
2
And just
potentially thousands of discrimination claimants.
recently, the state’s intermediate appellate court rejected a putative
class action on behalf of allegedly aggrieved electric utility
3
ratepayers across Minnesota and the Dakotas. In both cases, the
courts followed the United States Supreme Court’s lead in
protecting regulatory uniformity by directing the plaintiffs to find
4
available relief in the governing agency realm.
In the years ahead, regulated defendants will seek to realize
the doctrine’s ample protections, while plaintiffs will endeavor to
define its limitations. With decades of federal precedent as a
guide, however, history teaches that in Minnesota the doctrine will
continue to serve its principle purpose: keeping regulation to the
regulators.

1. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 314 (Minn.
2006).
2. Id. at 311.
3. Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 755–57 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15, 2008).
4. See id.; Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 311.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/4

2

Decker: The Filed-rate Doctrine: Leaving Regulation to the Regulators
4. DECKER - ADC

2008]

5/2/2008 10:45:19 AM

THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE

1353

II. BACKGROUND
Federal and state laws subject certain industries to regulatory
5
oversight. The means for such oversight are tariffs that are filed
with, and then approved and administered by, government
agencies or commissions. The tariffs specify the allowable “rates,”
which by definition include the charges and, often times, the
6
services provided by the regulated companies.
The United States Supreme Court has dealt with the legal
ramifications of filed rates for almost a century. The filed-rate
doctrine first emerged in the railroad context and then spread to
7
other industries subject to regulation by filed tariffs. From the
beginning, the high court has zealously protected the regulatory
uniformity afforded by tariff schemes by prohibiting private lawsuit
encroachment.
Now, the doctrine has taken root in Minnesota. But what has
been planted? What form shall it take? Only time will tell, but as
Justice Holmes so aptly observed: “In order to know what [the law]
8
is, we must know what it has been and what it tends to become.”
When considered in the proper historical context, the looming
effect of the filed-rate doctrine in Minnesota is evident.
A. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Kirby
The Minnesota Supreme Court traces the doctrine’s origins
9
back to 1922, but the rationale began percolating in even earlier
10
precedents. Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Kirby arose out of a
railroad-shipper dispute over the transportation of high-grade

5. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2006) (natural gas); 47 U.S.C. § 203 (2006)
(telecommunications); MINN. STAT. § 70A.06 (2006) (insurance); MINN. STAT. §
216B.05 (2006) (gas and electric services).
6. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006) (requiring filing of “charges” and all
“classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges”); MINN. STAT. §
216B.02, subdiv. 5 (2006) (defining “rate” as “every compensation, charge, fare,
toll, tariff, rental, and classification, or any of them, demanded, observed, charged,
or collected by any public utility for any service and any rules, practices, or
contracts affecting” prices or services).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
9. Schermer v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn.
2006) (citing Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922)).
10. 225 U.S. 155 (1912). Given the prevalence of railroad litigants in filedrate jurisprudence, such cases will be referenced by the non-railroad party (e.g.,
Kirby).
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11

horses.
Pursuant to the then-prevailing incarnation of the
12
Interstate Commerce Act, the railroad’s shipping rates (i.e., its
services and associated charges) had been published in a tariff that
13
was on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The
commerce act prohibited the railroad from deviating from the
14
tariff terms.
Standard tariff services were not sufficient for the shipper;
timeliness concerns demanded that the horses be shipped via a fast
15
stock train. To accommodate those needs the railroad agreed to
16
expedite delivery. The railroad ultimately breached the contract
17
by getting the horses to their destination after the promised time.
18
A lawsuit to recover damages followed.
The Supreme Court rejected the lawsuit, finding that the
regulatory scheme prohibited the railroad from having to render
19
services outside of those required in the published rates.
The
demand for expedited service amounted to a prohibited
“preference or advantage” because no other shipper was privy to
the extra-tariff service:
An advantage accorded by special agreement which affects
the value of the service to the shipper and its cost to the
carrier should be published in the tariffs; and for a breach
of such a contract, relief will be denied, because its
allowance without such publication is a violation of the
act. It is also illegal because it is an undue advantage, in
20
that it is not one open to all others in the same situation.
Thus, even before the phrase “filed-rate doctrine” entered the
lexicon of regulated commerce, Kirby recognized that a tariff
11. Id. at 162–63.
12. See generally Rene Sacasas, The Filed Tariff Doctrine: Casualty or Survivor of
Deregulation?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing the Interstate Commerce Act
and surveying the three major phases of federal regulation under the Act).
13. Kirby, 225 U.S. at 163. The Interstate Commerce Commission, which was
disbanded and absorbed by the Department of Transportation in 1995, was
established by the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and regulated surface
transportation between the states through certification of carriers and pipelines
and through monitoring quality and pricing. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (8th
ed. 2004).
14. Kirby, 225 U.S. at 163–64.
15. Id. at 162.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 162–63.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 164–66.
20. Id. at 165.
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21

scheme precludes deviation from regulatorily-approved terms.
Notably, the damaged party’s ignorance of the published terms was
of no import:
That the defendant in error did not see and did not know
that the published rates and schedules made no provision
for the service he contracted for, is no defense. For the
purposes of the present question he is presumed to have
known. The rates were published and accessible, and,
however difficult to understand, he must be taken to have
22
contracted for an advantage not open to others.
The rationale’s broad sweep may be startling, but Kirby would
not be the last time that a tariff would preclude civil litigation from
compromising the regulatory scheme.
B. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell
The next chapter in the filed-rate saga was Louisville &
23
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Maxwell, a challenge to tariff-based
24
The operative facts are straightforward: the tariff
charges.
specified rates for carriage; Maxwell was promised and charged a
25
cheaper rate; the railroad sued to recover the undercharge.
26
Maxwell prevailed until the high court weighed in.
The Court did not hesitate to enforce the tariff because
“[u]nder the interstate commerce act, the rate of the carrier duly
filed is the only lawful charge. Deviation from it is not permitted
27
upon any pretext.” The decision echoed Kirby’s strict application
in favor of uniform regulation: “Shippers and travelers are charged
with notice, of [the tariff], and they as well as the carrier must
abide by it, unless it is found by the Commission to be
28
unreasonable.”
The seemingly unfair impact to Maxwell was acknowledged,
but not relevant: “This rule is undeniably strict, and it obviously
21. Id. at 166 (“To guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a
particular train was to give an advantage or preference not open to all, and not
provided for in the published tariffs.”).
22. Id. at 166 (citing Tex. & P. R.R. Co. v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242
(1906)).
23. 237 U.S. 94 (1915).
24. Id. at 95–96.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 97.
28. Id.
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may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies the policy which
has been adopted by Congress in the regulation of interstate
29
commerce in order to prevent unjust discrimination.”
Thus
Maxwell establishes that tariff-based charges will always prevail, and
in this sense, the precedent represents the filed-rate doctrine at its
most basic.
C. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.
Ten years after Kirby first roped-off the regulatory regime from
judicial action, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
developing doctrine barred litigation arising out of tariff-related
matters no matter what form such claims may take. Keogh v. Chicago
& Northwestern Railway Co. was an anti-trust action brought by an
30
excelsior and flax tow shipper.
Keogh sued eight railroad
companies and a dozen individuals whose conspiracy to restrain
31
trade had caused damage.
Liability on the merits was not a close call: a committee formed
by the various railroads secured an agreement among competitors
32
This scheme thereby
to fix interstate transportation rates.
33
eliminated competition and “interstate commerce was restrained.”
The damages suffered by Keogh were not simply theoretical: “[t]he
uniform rates so established were arbitrary and unreasonable; they
were higher than those theretofore charged; and they were higher
than the rates that would have been, if competition had not been
34
thus eliminated.”
The railroad’s only defense was the filed-rate doctrine. The
complained-of rates had been filed with the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and despite an administrative investigation prompted
by Keogh’s complaints, the Commission had blessed the pricing
35
structure. The Supreme Court was called upon to answer whether
Keogh could seek damages when the “instrument by which Keogh
is alleged to have been damaged are rates approved by the
36
Commission.”

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159 (1922).
Id.
Id. at 159–60.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 161.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss4/4

6

Decker: The Filed-rate Doctrine: Leaving Regulation to the Regulators
4. DECKER - ADC

2008]

5/2/2008 10:45:19 AM

THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE

1357

The tariff scheme trumped Keogh’s anti-trust protections.
Writing for the court, Justice Brandeis found that “[a] rate is not
necessarily illegal because it is the result of a conspiracy in restraint
37
of trade in violation of the Anti-Trust Act.” Rather, the act only
affords a “right of action to one who has been injured in his
business or property” and, importantly, “injury implies violation of
38
a legal right.” Therein lay the undoing of Keogh’s claims:
The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to
a rate are measured by the published tariff. Unless and
until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, for all
purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper.
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or
39
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.
In other words, an anti-trust injury could not be pursued if Keogh
had no legal right to the “competitive” rate upon which the claim
would be based.
The Court observed that the net effect of affording Keogh
recourse would be to grant a rate different from that provided by
the tariff, thereby giving Keogh an extra-tariff preference over
40
The ability of similarly-damaged persons to
other ratepayers.
redress like damages made no difference: “[i]t is no answer to say
that each of these might bring a similar action under [the Anti-trust
Act]. Uniform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless
the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts
41
gave to each the same measure of relief.” Because Keogh lacked a
right to a rate beyond that provided in the tariff—even though the
tariff was the product of anti-competitive conduct—the anti-trust
42
damages lawsuit could not proceed.
D. Davis v. Cornwell
Justice Brandeis solidified the high court’s tariff jurisprudence

37. Id. at 162.
38. Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Tex. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426,
440 (1907)).
42. Id. The Court did not rule out governmental criminal or injunctive
redress against the railroads. Id. at 162 (stating that “[t]he fact that these rates
had been approved by the Commission would not, it seems, bar proceedings by
the government”).
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43

in Davis v. Cornwell. Davis involved a railroad’s promise to provide
freight cars on a date certain—a term not contemplated by the
44
governing tariff. When the railroad failed to perform, the shipper
45
successfully sued until the case reached the high court.
In setting aside the damage award, the Supreme Court
succinctly summed up the dispositive situation: “The obligation of
the common carrier implied in the tariff is to use diligence to
provide, upon reasonable notice, cars for loading at the time
desired. A contract to furnish cars on a day certain imposes a
46
greater obligation than that implied in the tariff.”
The cause of action could not be sustained because the lawsuit
47
attempted to impose extra-tariff duties.
Even though the
underlying conduct—i.e., the timing of car delivery—was merely
ancillary to the transportation services that were the true object of
the tariff, the Court refused to countenance the imposition of
extra-tariff duties outside of the regulatory scheme:
[T]hat the thing contracted for in this case was a service
preliminary to the loading is not a difference of legal
significance. The contract to supply cars for loading on a
day named provides for a special advantage to the
particular shipper, as much as a contract to expedite the
cars when loaded. It was not necessary to prove that a
preference resulted in fact. The assumption by the carrier
48
of the additional obligation was necessarily a preference.
E.

Chicago & Northwest Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile
Co.

Many years and justices passed through the Supreme Court
between Davis and Chicago & Northwest Transportation Co. v. Kalo
49
Although technically not a filed-rate doctrine
Brick & Tile Co.
precedent, Kalo Brick offers insight into the Court’s continuing
focus on preserving the uniformity and centrality of regulatory
oversight through administrative filings.
43. 264 U.S. 560 (1924).
44. Id. at 561.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 562 (“[Kirby] settled that a special contract to transport a car by a
particular train, or on a particular day, is illegal, when not provided for in the
tariff.”).
48. Id.
49. 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
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50

Kalo Brick challenged a railroad’s branch line abandonment.
The railroad served only one shipper on the line, and the
51
abandonment put the shipper out of business. Over the shipper’s
objection, the Interstate Commerce Commission granted the
railroad’s request to cast off the line due to conditions (a mud
52
slide) beyond the railroad’s control.
The shipper did not appeal the Commission’s administrative
decision, but rather sued in state court on various statutory and
common law grounds, including negligent failure to maintain the
roadbed and tortious interference with the shipper’s contractual
53
relations. The state trial court dismissed on preemption grounds,
but the intermediate appellate court reversed on a theory that the
federal and state schemes provided “complementary” relief for
54
55
injured persons. The state’s high court denied review.
Writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, Justice Marshall
reversed on federal-preemption grounds in an opinion rife with
56
For instance, the Court
filed-rate doctrine implications.
characterized the state appellate court decision as amounting “to a
holding that a state can impose sanctions upon a regulated carrier
for doing that which only the Commission, acting pursuant to the
will of Congress, has the power to declare unlawful or
57
unreasonable.” Indeed, “it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the instant litigation represents little more than an attempt by
a disappointed shipper to gain from the Iowa courts the relief it was
58
denied by the Commission.”
The high court admonished the complaint as essentially
charging the railroad with acting “unreasonably” despite the
administrative approval:
Respondent in essence seeks to use state law to compel
petitioner to furnish cars in spite of the congressional
decision to leave regulation of car service to the
Commission. But “the duty to provide cars is not
absolute,” and the law “exacts only what is reasonable of
50. Id. at 314.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 314–15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 316.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 317–24.
57. Id. at 324 (citing Chicago v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co., 357
U.S. 77, 87 (1958)).
58. Id.
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the railroads under the existing circumstances.”
The
judgment as to what constitutes reasonableness belongs exclusively
to the Commission.
It would vitiate the overarching
congressional intent of creating “an efficient and
nationally integrated railroad system,” to permit the State
of Iowa to use the threat of damages to require a carrier to
do exactly what the Commission is empowered to excuse.
A system under which each State could, through its courts,
impose on railroad carriers its own version of reasonable
service requirements could hardly be more at odds with
the uniformity contemplated by Congress in enacting the
60
Interstate Commerce Act.
In the field of regulated commerce, therefore,
“reasonableness” determinations are for administrative assessment
and an agency blesses the reasonableness of a “rate” by approving
the railroad’s filing. As a result, a post-hoc attack by means of a
negligence action could not be sustained:
[T]he questions respondent seeks to raise in the state—
whether roadbed maintenance was negligent or
reasonable and whether petitioner abandoned its line
with some tortious motive—are precisely the sort of
concerns that Congress intended the Commission to
address in weighing abandonment requests from the
61
carriers subject to its regulation.
F.

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall

A tariff’s terminal effect on litigation was confirmed in
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, in which the doctrine was
officially extended beyond the confines of earlier Interstate
62
Commerce Act precedents. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. (Arkla)
purchased natural gas from Frank Hall et al., pursuant to a 1952
contract that included a fixed price schedule and a “favored
63
Pursuant to this clause, if Arkla purchased
nations clause.”
natural gas from the same gas field from which Hall was producing,

59. Id. at 325 (quoting Milmine Grain Co. v. Norfolk & W. R.R. Co., 352
I.C.C. 575, 585 (1976) (citing Elgin Coal Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 277
F. Supp. 247, 250 (E.D. Tenn. 1967))). See also Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Barkley,
276 U.S. 482, 484 (1928).
60. Id. at 325–26 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 326–27.
62. 453 U.S. 571, 578–79 (1981).
63. Id. at 573.
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but at a higher rate than Arkla was paying to Hall, then Hall would
64
be entitled to a higher price. In 1954, Hall filed—and the Federal
Power Commission (FEP) approved—the Arkla gas purchase
65
agreement.
Several years later, Arkla purchased certain leaseholds from
the United States and began producing its own gas from the field
66
Hall was using. Believing that this transaction invoked the priceadjustment clause, Hall filed a lawsuit seeking damages equal to the
difference between the amounts that Arkla had paid and those it
should have paid assuming the favored nations clause had been
67
triggered. The district court found that the deal with the United
68
States did, in fact, trigger the favored nations clause. Nonetheless,
the filed-rate doctrine precluded an award of damages for
69
completed sales.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed, finding that Hall
was entitled to damages between 1961 and 1972 regardless of the
70
filed-rate doctrine. Shortly after this state supreme court ruling,
however, the FEP entered the fray by concluding that the allowance
of damages by the state supreme court violated the filed-rate
71
doctrine.
Settling the dispute, the United States Supreme Court
recounted how the filed-rate doctrine had developed through
Interstate Commerce Act cases, but noted that the rule “has been
extended across the spectrum of regulated utilities.
‘The
considerations underlying the doctrine . . . are preservation of the
agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of rates and the
need to ensure that regulated companies charge only those rates of
72
which the agency has been made cognizant.’” Protecting agency
primacy against litigation attacks on regulatory-tariff matters was
deemed equally applicable in analogous industries like natural gas
73
production and sales.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 574.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 574–75.
70. Id. at 575.
71. Id. at 576.
72. Id. at 577–78 (quoting City of Cleveland v. FPC, 525 F.2d 845, 854 (D.C.
Cir. 1976)); see also City of Piqua v. FERC, 610 F.2d 950, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
73. Id.
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The requested damages could not be allowed because “[n]ot
only do the courts lack authority to impose a different rate than the
one approved by the Commission, but the Commission itself has no
74
power to alter a rate retroactively.” Consequently:
It would undermine the congressional scheme of uniform
rate regulation to allow a state court to award as damages
a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never
found to be reasonable within the meaning of the Act.
Following that course would permit state courts to grant
regulated sellers greater relief than they could obtain
75
from the Commission itself.
In short, “[i]t would surely be inconsistent with this congressional
purpose to permit a state court to do through a breach of contract
76
action what the Commission itself may not do.”
The seemingly-unfair impact of the Court’s ruling was
emphasized in Justice Powell’s dissent: “Despite the fact that Arkla
breached its contract, and despite the fact that no federal policy is
threatened by allowing the Louisiana courts to redress that breach,
the Court today denies respondents the benefit of their lawful
77
bargain.” Nonetheless, the filed-rate doctrine prevailed.
G. AT&T v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
As much as Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. represents the “rate”
aspect of the filed-rate doctrine, AT&T v. Central Office Telephone
78
Inc. addresses the “services” called for by filed rates. When the
filed-rate doctrine is brought to bear, the result for litigation is the
same.
AT&T arose out of a dispute between the provider (AT&T)
and
a
reseller
(Central
Office)
of
long-distance
79
Central Office complained that
telecommunications services.
contracted-for order fillings and account billings were late and that
80
other agreed-upon service options had not been delivered. The
tariff covered provisioning and billing duties by committing those
service-related responsibilities to AT&T’s discretion:
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 586 (Powell, J., dissenting).
524 U.S. 214 (1998).
Id. at 216–20.
Id. at 220.
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[W]hereas [Central Office] asks to enforce a guarantee
that orders would be provisioned within 30 to 90 days, the
tariff leaves it up to [AT&T] to “establis[h] and
confir[m]” a due date for provisioning, requires that
petitioner merely make “every reasonable effort” to meet
that due date, and if it fails gives the customer no recourse
except to “cancel the order without penalty or payment of
81
nonrecurring charges.”
Although AT&T’s obligations were established by the tariff, the
82
district court allowed Central Office’s lawsuit to proceed.
Enforcing what was deemed to be an AT&T contractual
commitment, the jury awarded $13 million in lost profits (later
83
sliced to $1.154 million).
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lost profits award
without regard to the published tariff, believing that “this case does
not involve rates or rate-setting, but rather involves the provisioning
84
of services and billing.” Moreover, the circuit court sent the case
85
back to the district court for a punitive damages assessment.
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s rates-versusservices dichotomy:
Rates . . . do not exist in isolation. They have meaning
only when one knows the services to which they are
attached. Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as
a claim for inadequate services and vice versa. “If
‘discrimination in charges’ does not include non-price
features, then the carrier could defeat the broad purpose
of the statute by the simple expedient of providing an
additional benefit at no additional charge . . . . An
unreasonable ‘discrimination in charges,’ that is, can
come in the form of a lower price for an equivalent service
or in the form of an enhanced service for an equivalent
86
price.”
Invoking the earliest tariff-related precedents, Justice Scalia
reminded that challenges to tariff-provided services offend the
filed-rate doctrine just as much as attacks on tariff-approved
pricing:
81. Id. at 225.
82. Id. at 221.
83. Id.
84. Cent. Office Tel., Inc. v. AT&T, 108 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 1997).
85. Id.
86. AT&T, 524 U.S. at 223 (quoting Competitive Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC,
998 F.2d 1058, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
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In Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 32 S. Ct.
648, 56 L. Ed. 1033 (1912), we rejected a shipper’s breachof-contract claim against a railroad for failure to ship a
carload of race horses by a particularly fast train. We held
that the contract was invalid as a matter of law because the
carrier’s tariffs “did not provide for an expedited service,
nor for transportation by any particular train,” and
therefore the shipper received “an undue advantage . . .
that is not one open to others in the same situation.”
Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560 (1924), we
invalidated the carrier’s agreement to provide the shipper
with a number of railroad cars on a specified day; such a
special advantage, we said, “is illegal, when not provided
87
for in the tariff.”
AT&T left no doubt that ratepayers cannot elude the filed-rate
bar by pleading “services” claims; challenges to rates and claims
against services are two sides of the same coin for filed-rate
purposes. In both cases, respect for agency jurisdiction requires
that courts dismiss tariff-related complaints.
III. MINNESOTA EMBRACES THE FILED-RATE DOCTRINE
With the trail blazed by the likes of Kirby, Keogh, and AT&T,
the Minnesota courts were not faced with a daunting
jurisprudential leap. Nonetheless, the impact of the Schermer court
formally adopting the filed-rate doctrine cannot be overstated: the
precedent definitively reset the balance between regulated entities
and their would-be litigation adversaries.
A. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
1.

Background

Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. arose out of an
88
Insurance rates, like railroad, gas, and
insurance dispute.
89
telecommunications rates, are subject to tariff filings.
The
Minnesota Department of Commerce (DOC) exclusively decides
whether an insurer’s proposed rates are “excessive, inadequate or

87. Id. at 224 (citations omitted).
88. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 307 (Minn.
2006).
89. MINN. STAT. § 70A.06, subdiv. 1 (2006).
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90

unfairly discriminatory.” One statute in particular—subdivision
13(b) to section 72A.20 of the Minnesota Statutes—prohibits rate
discrimination on the basis of the age of the structure to be
insured.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Company (State Farm) filed an
91
insurance rate plan with the DOC on May 8, 1997. That plan gave
some homeowners a discount and imposed a surcharge on others
92
based upon the age of the home’s electrical wiring. Homes with
electrical systems eight years old and newer received varying
discounts; homes with electrical systems between nine and thirtynine years old received no discount or surcharge; and homes with
93
systems thirty-nine years and older paid a six percent surcharge.
Tying the discount/surcharge to the age of the electrical
system was no accident: State Farm sought to satisfy an exception to
section 72A.20, which provides that while insurance rates may not
be based solely on the age of the primary structure, the age of the
electrical system may be considered to the extent that factor
94
reflects a risk of loss. In fact, however, the actuarial data that State
Farm relied upon to show that older electrical systems increase risk
encompassed all non-catastrophic losses rather than those directly
95
related to older electrical systems. Despite this apparent illogic,
96
the rate plan was approved on July 23, 1997.
Years after the DOC approval, a State Farm policyholder
received a premium increase notice based upon the age of the
97
electrical system. The policyholder complained to the DOC, and
98
State Farm was required to produce supporting actuarial data.
State Farm eventually conceded that it lacked “electrical system
99
cause-of-loss data to support” the rate surcharge.
The DOC
subsequently found State Farm’s rate to be based upon structure
age and, therefore, violative of section 72A.20, subdivision 13(b). A
consent decree followed, in which State Farm denied the
100
allegations but agreed to cease and desist.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. § 70A.04, subdiv. 1.
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 310.
Id.
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 72A.20, subdiv. 13(b) (2006).
Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Doctrine is Brought to Bear

Within days of the consent decree, a putative class action was
101
The Schermer class was certified to include all insurance
filed.
policyholders who had paid surcharges based upon the now102
rejected rate plan. The class alleged “that [a] surcharge that was
imposed by [the insurer] on homes whose electrical systems were
103
The lawsuit
more than 39 years old was racially discriminatory.”
104
sought a refund of all impermissible surcharges.
The insurer moved for summary judgment on filed-rate
105
The district court obliged, finding that “the
doctrine grounds.
filed-rate doctrine prevents a court from retroactively changing a
rate that has been filed with and approved by a state regulatory
106
107
agency.” The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
Before the Minnesota Supreme Court, the class declared the
filed-rate doctrine to be inapplicable “because their challenge is
not to the reasonableness of the [tariff that had been filed with the
responsible agency], but to its legality, which is a matter within the
108
peculiar expertise of courts.”
Also, damages were said to be
109
“judicially ascertainable.” Both contentions came up short.
The Schermer court began by noting that the United States
Supreme Court had not committed to one filed-rate doctrine
110
rationale. The doctrine sounded in “separation of powers” when
turning upon a legislative body conferring upon an administrative
agency exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of a
111
particular rate. Simultaneously, justiciability concerns are piqued
because “a court is not well suited to determine, if the rate
approved by the commission were found to be unlawful, what other
rate the commission would find to be reasonable and non112
discriminatory to take its place.”
In that vein, Schermer endorsed
an observation from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 309.
Id. at 311.
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 311–12.
Id. at 312.
Id. (citing Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1922)).
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[R]egulatory agencies have special expertise, investigative
capacities, and experience and familiarity with the
regulated industry that enable them to “consider the
whole picture regarding the reasonableness of a proposed
rate,” whereas the courts are ill-suited to second-guess the
113
decisions of regulatory agencies.
The Schermer court reasoned that “the filed-rate doctrine
should reflect separation of powers and comity considerations
114
With regard to
[which] the Class’s argument overlooks.”
separation of powers, the court recognized that “ratemaking is a
115
legislative function.” Succinctly put:
[I]f a court were to entertain a private claim that a
regulated rate was unreasonable or unlawful, it would
necessarily have to second-guess the decisions of the
agency to whom the legislature has delegated the
responsibility to approve rates, and a court generally
would not have the technical expertise to do so nor the
capacity to consider the entire rate structure or to balance
116
all competing interests.
The Schermer court likewise adopted the justiciability rationale,
finding that “courts are ill-equipped to retroactively reallocate rates
among ratepayers, by modifying the rates for some ratepayers but
117
Further, “the regulation of rates is an ‘intricate
not for others.”
ongoing process’ and interference by a court ‘may set in motion an
ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments’ which courts
118
are powerless to address.” Thus consistent with the foundational
filed-rate jurisprudence, the Schermer court recognized and
defended the uniformity and centrality of regulation intended by
119
tariff mechanisms.

113. Id. (accord Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17, 20, 21 (2d Cir.
1994)). Although filed-rate jurisprudence was born in the federal courts, the
Schermer court recognized that the doctrine applies equally to rates filed with state
agencies. Id. Indeed, the court noted that in such cases the doctrine is a matter of
state law (albeit the Schermer court heavily relied upon United States Supreme
Court precedents). Id. at 312–13.
114. Id. at 314.
115. Id. (citing Nw. Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 28, 216 N.W.2d 841, 857
(1974) (citation omitted)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 315 (citing Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n,
369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn. 1985)).
118. Id. (quoting Peoples Natural Gas, 369 N.W.2d at 535).
119. Id.
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No Exceptions

Faced with legal peril, the class urged that the filed-rate
doctrine cannot trump the lawsuit because the Minnesota
Constitution guarantees “a certain remedy in the laws for all
120
Unpersuaded, the Schermer court concluded
injuries or wrongs.”
that the comprehensive regulatory scheme protected the class
121
members and all ratepayers.
The Minnesota State Constitution only preserves “remedies for
122
which the legislature has not provided a reasonable substitute.”
The court found such a reasonable substitute in the pervasive
administrative oversight:
The statutes that regulate insurance companies in general
and rates in particular—including the rate filing
requirements, the DOC review requirements, the DOC
investigative responsibilities, and the DOC and district
court enforcement capabilities—provide remedies that
ensure protection of the interests of ratepayers. In fact,
the collective requirements of those statutes relieve
individual ratepayers of the burden of reviewing,
monitoring, or challenging rates and, instead, charge the
DOC with the responsibility to assure ratepayers that rates
will not be excessive. This regulatory scheme is a
reasonable substitute for the common law claim that the
123
Class will be prevented from asserting.
The Schermer court countenanced no exceptions to the
doctrine despite acknowledging that other courts have found no
filed-rate bar when:
•

A rate filed with a state regulatory agency violates a
124
federal anti-discrimination statute;

•

The regulatory agency’s review was minimal;

125

or

120. Id. at 316 (quoting MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8).
121. Id. at 316–17.
122. Id. at 316 (quoting Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10,
14 (Minn. 1986)).
123. Id. at 316–17.
124. Id. at 317 (citing Saunders v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 440 F.3d 940, 944–45
(8th Cir. 2006)).
125. Id. (citing Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393–94 (9th Cir.
1992)).
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126

Fiduciary duty breaches are present.

Taking a cue from the Ninth Circuit, the Schermer class
contended that an exception for filed rates should apply because
127
The court
agency review of insurance rates is “passive.”
disagreed, finding that insurance pricing in Minnesota is subject to
“meaningful review” because the insurance commissioner is
charged with enforcing the laws, insurers must file all rates with the
commissioner, and the rates cannot be “excessive, inadequate, or
128
unfairly discriminatory.”
The DOC is also responsible for
“examin[ing] the affairs and conditions of every insurer licensed in
129
the state not less frequently than once every five years.” Although
“the insurance regulatory scheme is less stringent than, for
example, the scheme for electrical, gas, and telephone utilities . . .
this difference in degree of regulation is one that the legislature
has chosen and it does not materially impact the rationale for the
130
filed rate doctrine.” Therefore, the case had to be dismissed.
B. Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co.
1.

Background

With Schermer’s broad and dispositive holding in place, the
question remained as to how Minnesota courts would give effect to
the principle. The first appellate application—Hoffman v. Northern
131
States Power Co.—embraced an expansive approach.
132
Hoffman is an electricity case.
Like their counterparts in
railroad, gas, telecommunications, and insurance businesses,
electric utilities must file tariffs setting forth the “rates” and “all
rules that, in the judgment of the [Minnesota Public Utilities
126. Id. (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Miss.
2001), overruled on other grounds by Capital City Ins. Co. v. G.B. “Boots” Smith Corp.,
889 So. 2d 505 (Miss. 2004)). The Schermer court expressly refused to address
whether a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act might vitiate the filedrate doctrine. Id. at 317 n.6. See also MINN. STAT. § 363A.33 (2006).
127. Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 317.
128. Id. at 318 (quotations and citations omitted).
129. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 60A.031, subdiv. 1 (2006)).
130. Id.
131. See generally Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2008), rev. granted (Minn. Apr. 15, 2008). The Minnesota Supreme Court has
not yet set the case for argument.
132. Id.
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Commission (MPUC)], in any manner affect the service or
133
product.” The MPUC is statutorily vested with exclusive authority
134
to assess the “reasonableness” of the tariff.
Once in effect,
electric utilities cannot sell or distribute electricity except as
135
provided for in the tariff.
The Hoffman complaint stemmed from a dispute over the
“point of connection” between Northern States Power Company’s
(NSP) wires and the customers’ homes.
According to respondents, NSP initially connects a
customer to its system by affixing wires to lugs within the
customer’s meter box. After securing this connection,
NSP installs a seal on the meter box to prevent access by
the customer, a measure provided for in the tariffs.
Respondents contend that over time these connections
can become corroded, loose, or both, causing a fire
hazard. They argue that NSP is obligated under the tariffs
to inspect and maintain its electrical wiring up through
136
and including this connection point.
The lawsuit was filed as a putative class action on behalf of all
residential NSP electric customers in Minnesota, North Dakota,
137
and South Dakota.
2.

Schermer is Enforced

NSP invoked the filed-rate doctrine, but had to go to the
138
In short, the Minnesota
appeals court to realize its protections.
Court of Appeals concluded that the regulatory implications of
allowing the litigation to proceed triggered the filed-rate doctrine
139
as adopted in Schermer.
The appeals court surveyed Schermer’s boundaries with the
jurisprudence upon which the precedent had been based:
The filed-rate doctrine, as applied by the United States
Supreme Court for more than a century, forbids a
regulated entity from charging its customers a rate other
than the one duly filed with the appropriate regulatory
133. MINN. STAT. § 216B.05, subdiv. 2 (2006).
134. Id. § 216A.05, subdiv. 2(2).
135. Id. §§ 216B.06, 216B.07.
136. Hoffman, 743 N.W.2d at 753. Hoffman was decided on the pleadings, so
those allegations had to be regarded as true. See id.
137. Id. at 752.
138. See id. at 757.
139. Id.
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authority . . . . This preclusion against suit extends to
claims challenging the services provided in exchange for a
140
filed rate.
The appellate court found no filed-rate reason to distinguish
141
the insurance industry from the electric utility industry. Nor did
the court find an important distinction in that the Hoffman
plaintiffs “do not seek a refund of the rate paid, but rather contract
142
damages for the value of services promised but not provided.”
Further, the appeals court affirmed the filed-rate doctrine
understanding that the form of a claim or relief does not control
the analysis:
We reject this latter distinction as no more than semantic.
In determining the application of the filed-rate doctrine,
our focus is on “the impact the court’s decision will have
on agency procedures and rate determinations.” And,
here, as in Schermer, respondents underestimate the extent
to which a judicial decision in their favor would interfere
with rate-making. Whether properly characterized as a
request for additional services or enforcement of the tariff
“as it stands,” respondents’ claims will inevitably impact
the rate-making process between NSP and the MPUC.
Public-utility rate setting is a complex process, involving
the agency’s review and careful balancing of multiple
factors affecting the regulated entity’s appropriate rate of
return. A judgment from the court in this matter—
whether or not it merely construes the tariff—will
143
interfere with the rate-making process.
Consistent with the emphasis on the effect that prosecuting a
civil remedy could have on the filed-rate structure, the appellate
court also rejected the suggestion that a claim that merely seeks to
enforce the terms of a tariff should not be barred by the filed-rate
144
The court acknowledged “a split among federal
doctrine.

140. Id. at 755 (citing H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir.
1992); AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998) (citations
omitted)). The appellate court made it clear that the doctrine was not merely
statutory: “the supreme court emphasized the separation-of-powers purposes
underlying the filed-rate doctrine, noting that ‘ratemaking is a legislative
function.’” Id. (quoting Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 314) (citation omitted)).
141. Id. at 756.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citations omitted).
144. Id. The claimants were relying on at least two other cases decided on
federal-law grounds. See Brown v. MCI Worldcom Network Servs, Inc., 277 F.3d
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authorities as to whether the doctrine precludes claims that are
seeking no more than interpretation and enforcement of the terms
145
of a tariff.”
But the Brown-line of thinking was rebuffed because
such decisions do not explain “how such a claim is any less invasive
upon the administrative rate-making process. Nor do they address
the separation-of-powers principles that the supreme court found
146
crucial in Schermer.”
The MPUC, not the courts, have the exclusive say:
As the agency charged by statute with approving rates,
MPUC is in the best position to determine whether the
point of connection must be maintained and, if so, by
whom. If respondents petitioned MPUC to hold that NSP
must maintain the points of connection, and MPUC
concluded in respondents’ favor, it is also the entity with
the power to consider the costs of such a burden, adjust
147
the rate accordingly, and enforce that rate.
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD
The filed-rate doctrine may be new to Minnesota, but it arrives
battle tested. No less an authority than the United States Supreme
Court has poked and prodded the theory from Kirby through
AT&T. If a law may be understood by “know[ing] what it has been
148
and what it tends to become,” there is little doubt that Schermer
forecasts rough seas for litigation efforts that intrude upon the
administrative oversight of regulated commerce.
Consider the genealogy:
•

Kirby: company cannot be held liable to provide
services beyond the tariff despite agreement to do
149
more.

1166, 1166 (9th Cir. 2002); Lipton v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 182,
182 (D.D.C. 2001).
145. Id. at 754 (comparing H.J., 954 F.2d at 488 with Brown, 277 F.3d at 1166).
The appellate court noted that federal authorities do not control the analysis
because the filed-rate doctrine is a matter of state law. Id. at 756.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. HOLMES, supra note 8.
149. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 163–66 (1912). See supra
Part II.A.
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•

Maxwell: tariff trumps contractual duty.

•

Keogh: anti-trust duties cannot be enforced once
complained-of conduct has been covered by
151
Specifically, “[t]he
regulatorily-approved tariffs.
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or
152
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”

•

Davis: duty to provide railroad cars on a date certain
unenforceable (despite agreement to do so) because
153
such services were not tariff-required.

•

Kalo Brick: courts may neither impose a roadbed
maintenance duty nor probe for tortious motivations
when railroad proceeded pursuant to regulatorily154
approved plan.

•

Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.: lawsuit precluded because
assumption that the regulatory agency would find
155
damages to be “reasonable” is wholly speculative.

•

AT&T: no damages for breach of contract or tortious
interference because regulated utility’s service
obligations are limited to the filed tariff regardless of
156
contrary promises.

150

Once the Minnesota Supreme Court accepted the prevailing
rationale, the result in Schermer was a foregone conclusion. After
all, the Schermer plaintiffs sought damages equal to the amount of a

150. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 96–97 (1915). See
supra Part II.B.
151. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162–64 (1922). See supra
Part II.C.
152. Keogh, 260 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted).
153. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 561–62 (1924). See supra Part II.D.
154. Chicago and Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324–
27 (1981). See also supra Part II.E.
155. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577–82 (1981). See
supra Part II.F.
156. AT&T v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 223–25 (1998). See supra
Part II.G.
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157

discriminatory surcharge.
If such damages were awarded, the
Schermer plaintiffs effectively would have paid a rate for insurance
services lower than that set forth in the regulatory tariff. The result
158
is a quintessential filed-rate doctrine transgression.
The same goes for the Hoffman litigants. Those plaintiffs
sought to enforce the tariff as they saw it, and felt that the courts
could simply calculate the value of the services to which they
159
Again, the
believed they were entitled, but had been denied.
court refused to meddle in MPUC tariff affairs because of the
160
regulatory disformity that would be wrought.
The tariff scheme
could not be unsettled by a damages award.
Importantly, the filed-rate doctrine does not only apply when
damages are analogous to some form of a rebate as in Schermer and
Hoffman. The horseman in Kirby sought compensation for the
damages he sustained when he did not receive the services for
161
So, too, did the telecommunications
which he had bargained.
162
What
reseller in AT&T seek compensation for lost profits.
mattered in those cases was not that the plaintiffs sought a refund
of rates paid, but rather that they sought to hold the regulated
entity liable for failing to fulfill a duty not provided for in the tariff.
Litigation that effectively demands extra-tariff efforts is thus equally
repelled by the historical doctrine.
Undoubtedly, the filed-rate doctrine will get much play in the
Minnesota courts in the coming years. While it remains to be seen
whether the courts will keep the doctrine whole or begin
embracing exceptions, it is clear that the balance in tariff-related
litigation has shifted toward regulatory uniformity and away from
regulation-by-litigation.
157. Schermer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn.
2006).
158. See, e.g., Ark. La. Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 579 (“It would undermine the
congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to award as
damages a rate never filed with the Commission and thus never found to be
reasonable within the meaning of the Act.”); Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260
U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (stating that “[i]f a shipper could recover . . . damages
resulting from the exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have
prevailed, the amount recovered might, like a rebate, operate to give him a
preference over his trade competitors”).
159. Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 752 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008).
160. Id. at 755.
161. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 162–63 (1912).
162. American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel. Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 220–21
(1998).
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